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Abstract—Parallel ﬁrewalls offer a scalable low latency design
for inspecting packets at high speeds. Typically consisting of
an array of m ﬁrewalls, these systems ﬁlter arriving packets
according to a security policy. Given the ﬁrewall array, the
rules can be distributed in two fashions. Data parallel copies the
e n t i r ep o l i c yt oe a c hﬁrewall and distributes packets. In contrast,
function parallel distributes the rules and duplicates packets.
The function parallel design can provide signiﬁcantly lower
delays than an equivalent data parallel design, however perfor-
mance is dependent on how the rules are distributed. Therefore,
policy management is vital to the performance of the function
parallel ﬁrewall system. This paper will describe the guidelines
necessary to maintain policy integrity, which guarantees that
a function parallel and a traditional ﬁrewall provide the same
action for a packet. Based on these requirements, a policy can
be divided into autonomous chains (sub-policies) that can be
distributed across the ﬁrewall array. Although determining the
optimal distribution will be shown to be NP-hard, an effective
algorithm will be described. Simulation results will indicate the
distribution algorithm can provide an 86% reduction in the
average processing delay as compared to previous distribution
methods.
Index Terms—Security, ﬁrewalls, parallel, policy, management
I. INTRODUCTION
Network ﬁrewalls must continually improve their perfor-
mance to meet increasing network speeds, trafﬁc volumes, and
Quality of Service (QoS) demands. Unfortunately, ﬁrewalls
often have more capabilities than standard networking devices,
and as a result the performance of these security devices lags
behind [1], [2], [3]. Furthermore, computer networks grow not
only in speed, but also in size, resulting in convoluted security
policies that take longer to apply to each packet [4], [5].
When a security solution cannot keep pace with the speed
of incoming data, it either allows packets through without
inspection or places incoming packets into a growing queue,
thus becoming vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
With either of these possibilities, even a network with a perfect
ﬁrewall policy (short in length and optimally ordered [6], [7])
is susceptible to attacks resulting in prolonged delays, data
loss, or both, and it is for this reason that a new ﬁrewall
architecture is necessary.
Parallel ﬁrewall designs provide a low latency solution,
scalable to increasing network speeds [1], [8]. Unlike a tradi-
tional single ﬁrewall, the parallel design consists of an array
of ﬁrewalls, each performing a portion of the work that a
single ﬁrewall performed. As network speeds increase, the
additional load is distributed across the array, providing a
solution that can be implemented using standard hardware.
There are two primary approaches to parallelization: data
parallel and function parallel, as shown in ﬁgure 2.
In a data parallel design, the ﬁrewall policy is copied to each
individual ﬁrewall in the array [1]. When a packet arrives, it
is sent to one ﬁrewall for processing; load balancing is then
necessary to prevent overloading one ﬁrewall in the array. This
design offers increased throughput over a single ﬁrewall archi-
tecture, and it is also redundant, providing protection against
device failure. Furthermore, the data parallel architecture has
a relatively simple design since adding or removing a ﬁrewall
does not require any changes to the other ﬁrewalls in the array.
However, stateful inspection requires that all trafﬁc from a
certain connection or exchange to traverse the same ﬁrewall.
Unfortunately, connection tracking is difﬁcult to perform at
high speeds [2], and the performance beneﬁt only occurs under
high trafﬁc load when all ﬁrewalls are busy.
A function parallel design uses the same ﬁrewall array but
distributes the rules, as seen in ﬁgure 2(b). Arriving packets
are duplicated so that each ﬁrewall processes the same packet,
but each ﬁrewall has fewer rules in its local policy [8], [9]. The
function parallel design has several unique advantages. First,
the function parallel design can result in faster processing since
every ﬁrewall is utilized to process a single packet. Reducing
the processing time, instead of the arrival rate (as with data
parallel), yields better performance because each ﬁrewall in
the array processes packets regardless of the trafﬁc load. The
processing delay can be reduced further with the addition of
new ﬁrewalls. Second, unlike the data parallel design, the
function parallel design can maintain state information about
existing connections. The new state rule can be placed in any
ﬁrewall since a packet will be processed by every ﬁrewall.
Of course the overall performance of a function parallel
design is dependent on the policy and how it is distributed.
For example, if a very small number of popular rules appear at
the beginning of the policy, then a data parallel design is more
effective. However, simulation results with realistic policies
will show the function parallel design can provide lower
processing delays. However as explained in this paper, theperformance increase will depend on how rules are distributed.
An important constraint on any new ﬁrewall design is that
the semantic integrity of the policy must be maintained; the
packets that were accepted or rejected by the original policy
must be acted upon in the same manner, without exception.
When distributing rules from the original policy, their relative
order must be preserved where there is an overlap in the
regions covered. This can be accomplished using accept sets
that describe the set of packets that will be accepted by a
policy. The union of the accept set of each ﬁrewall must equal
the accept set of the original policy (the array will accept
the same packets as a single ﬁrewall), while the intersection
must be empty (a legitimate packet is only accepted by one
ﬁrewall). While maintaining integrity, the rules must be placed
such that system performance is maximized. The sum of the
expected number of rule comparisons is used to evaluate rule
distributions, where a smaller value indicates lower latency.
To distribute rules across the array, the policy is ﬁrst divided
into rule chains (groups of intersecting rules) that can be
distributed to any ﬁrewall in the array. Using the cost metric,
rule chains are distributed to minimize the average number
of comparisons. The problem of ﬁnding a distribution of rule
chains with the minimum average number of comparisons is
shown to be NP-hard. However, a fast distribution method
is described that orders the rule chains, merges the chains in
each local policy, then sorts the local policies. Experimental
results show this distribution method can provide better results
than previous methods (over 86% improvement).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II reviews ﬁrewall policies and attributes that are used for
rule distribution for the function parallel ﬁrewall. The function
parallel ﬁrewall design, rule distribution, and management
are described in section III. Section IV will demonstrate the
performance of the function parallel rule distribution method.
Section V reviews the parallel ﬁrewall design and discusses
some open questions.
II. FIREWALL SECURITY POLICIES
As seen in ﬁgure 1(a), a security policy can be described as
an ordered set (list) of n rules, denoted as R = {r1,r 2,...,rn}.
When a packet arrives, it is compared with the rules to
determine the appropriate match. A packet matches a rule
when every tuple of the packet is a subset of the corresponding
rule tuple.
In terms of the Internet, a ﬁrewall rule commonly consists
of 5-tuples: protocol type, source IP address, source port
number, destination IP address, and destination port number
[5]. Tuple values can be fully speciﬁed, given as a range,
or contain wildcards ‘*’ in standard preﬁxf o r m a t .A sa
result, precedence constraints can exist between rules, which
indicates the relative order between certain rules must be
maintained [6]. In addition to the preﬁxes, each ﬁlter rule has
an action, which is to accept or deny.
Typically, rules are sequentially compared starting with ﬁrst
rule until a match is found. This is referred to as a ﬁrst-match
policy and is generally the default behavior for the majority of
ﬁrewall systems including the Linux ﬁrewall implementation
iptables [10].
A. Policy Accept and Deny Sets
Given a ﬁrewall security policy, it is important to determine
the packets that will be accepted, denied, or not match any
rule. Assume a policy R exists, let A be the set of packets
that will be accepted, let D be the set of packets that will be
denied, and let U be the set of packets that do not match any
rule. If the set of all possible packets is C, then a policy R is
comprehensive if U = ∅ (i.e. A ∪ D = C). Therefore, policy
R is comprehensive if for every possible packet a match is
found, which is an important objective. Furthermore, assume
R does not necessarily equal R in terms of the rules that
comprise the policies.
There are many different ways to implement a given policy
(e.g. using a single or parallel ﬁrewall) or even modify it
(e.g. reorder, combine, add, or remove rules); therefore, it
is important to determine equivalence and policy integrity.
Consider two comprehensive policies R and R that have
accept sets A and A respectively. The two policies are
considered equivalent if A = A. Therefore, if policy R is
replaced by an equivalent policy R then the integrity of
R is maintained. Therefore, it is important to maintain the
precedence constraints when implementing a ﬁrewall security
policy.
B. Policy Optimization
Given multiple equivalent policies, it is important to deter-
mine which equivalent policy will provide the best ﬁrewall
performance. Since the number of rule comparisons directly
impact system performance, a metric that can be used is the
average number of comparisons required to determine the
ﬁrst match [6]. Policies that have a lower average number
of comparisons should have lower processing delay.
Minimizing the number of rule comparisons requires infor-
mation not associated with a security policy. Given a policy,
certain ﬁrewall rules have a higher probability of matching a
packet than others. Using this information, it is possible to
create a policy proﬁle that indicates the probability of a ﬁrst
match for each rule in the policy. Let P = {p1,p 2,...,pn} be
the policy proﬁle, where pi is the probability that a packet will
ﬁrst match rule i. Furthermore, assume a packet will always
ﬁnd a match; therefore R is comprehensive,
n
i=1 pi =1 .U s -
ing this information, the average number of rule comparisons
required for a single ﬁrewall implementing R is
E(R)=
n 
i=1
i · pi (1)
III. POLICY MANAGEMENT FOR FUNCTION PARALLEL
FIREWALLS
As described in the introduction, a function parallel system
consists of an array of m ﬁrewalls connected to a packet
duplicator [8], [9]. Each ﬁrewall j has a local policy Rj that is
some portion of the rules of the original policy R. Therefore,
each ﬁrewall has a local accept set Aj and deny set Dj.A saSource Destination
No. Proto. IP Port IP Port Action Prob.
1 UDP 190.1.1.** * 80 deny 0.05
2 UDP 210.1.** * 90 accept 0.10
3 TCP 180.** 180.* 90 accept 0.15
4 TCP 210.** 220.* 80 accept 0.20
5 UDP 190.**** accept 0.20
6 ** * * * deny 0.30
(a) Example security policy consisting of multiple ordered rules.
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
(b) Policy DAG, vertices are rules and edges
are precedence requirements.
Fig. 1. Example ﬁrewall policy (ACL) and policy DAG.
R1 = {r1,r 2,r 3,r 4,r 5,r 6}
packet
distributor
•
R2 = {r1,r 2,r 3,r 4,r 5,r 6}
(a) Data parallel design, packets distributed across two pro-
cessors.
R1 = {r2,r 3,r 4,r 6}
packet
duplicator
λ •
R2 = {r1,r 5,r 6}
(b) Function parallel design, rules distributed across two pro-
cessors.
Fig. 2. Two parallel designs for network ﬁrewalls. The original security policy consists of six rules R = {r1,...,r6} and each design consists of two
ﬁrewalls (depicted as solid rectangles, where local policies are given within each rectangle).
packet arrives to the ﬁrewall system, it is duplicated and sent
to the queue of each ﬁrewall in the array. Thus, each ﬁrewall
will verify its own local policy against every packet that arrives
to the network. A ﬁrewall performs the action associated with
the rule in its local policy which matches the packet and then
proceeds to the next packet in its queue. Each ﬁrewall in the
array operates independently, therefore intercommunication is
not required [8].
Given this design, the local policies of each ﬁrewall must be
both comprehensive and disparate in terms of accept ranges.
To elaborate, the sum of the ranges of every rule in a local
policy must cover the entire range of possible packet header
conﬁgurations. Also, there may be no overlap of accept ranges,
those ranges which correspond to entrance to the network,
between any two ﬁrewalls. Together, these two requirements
assure that each ﬁrewall contains a rule which will match any
given packet, and that no two ﬁrewalls will ever duplicate the
same packet into the network. This guarantees integrity and
can be more formally stated in the following theorem. [8].
Theorem 1: An array of m ﬁrewalls arranged in a function
parallel fashion enforcing a comprehensive policy R can
operate independently and maintain integrity if policy rules
are distributed such that: each local policy is comprehensive, m
j=1 Aj = A,a n d
m
j=1 Aj = ∅.
Proof: The ﬁrst requirement, comprehensiveness, en-
sures each local policy will either accept or deny a packet
(
m
j=1 Uj = ∅). The second requirement
m
j=1 Aj = A indi-
cates that collectively the system will accept only the packets
accepted by the policy R. The last requirement,
m
j=1 Aj = ∅,
ensures multiple ﬁrewalls will never accept the same packet
(no overlaps in the local accept sets), therefore only one copy
of a packet will be accepted. As such, the integrity of the
policy R is maintained by the parallel ﬁrewall.
Several possible distributions may exist that meet require-
ments deﬁned in Theorem 1. Consider the distribution of the
policy given in Figure 1(a) across an array of two independent
ﬁrewalls shown in Figure 2(b). In this case, the local policy
of the upper ﬁrewall will only accept packets from the 210
and 180 address ranges, while the lower ﬁrewall will only
accept packets from the 190 address range. Duplicating the
deny all rule, r6, is required to make the local policies
comprehensive. Other distributions are possible, such as dis-
tributing rules based on the protocol (R1 = {r1,r 2,r 5,r 6} and
R2 = {r3,r 4,r 6}) or destination ports (R1 = {r1,r 4,r 5,r 6}
and R2 = {r2,r 3,r 6}). Given the number of possible distri-
butions, it is important to determine which provides the best
performance. In addition, the rule distribution must be done
quickly since the policy proﬁle (rule ﬁrst match probabilities)
will change over time.
A. Firewall Policy Distribution
The processor will inspect the arriving packet using the local
policy in a top-down fashion, starting with the ﬁrst rule, to
ﬁnd the ﬁrst match. The local policy must maintain integrity
as described by the original policy-DAG. For example, if
a precedence edge exists between two rules, and both are
assigned to the same processor, then their relative order in
the original policy must be maintained. This order prevents
shadowing in the local policy. In addition, rules must bedistributed so that only one processor will accept a legal
packet, and the remaining processors will deny it.
Given a ﬁrewall policy, several rule distributions may be
able to maintain integrity. Identifying the sets of rules that
form independent accept sets, called rule chains, can help
maintain integrity when rules are distributed. A rule chain
is the smallest ordered list of intersecting rules that forms an
accept set which does not intersect with another rule chain.
A rule chain can be found by starting with a rule in R
that does not have any preceding constraints (no incoming
preceding edges in the policy DAG) and then following the
precedence edges until a rule is encountered that has no
successive precedence constraints (no outgoing precedence
edges). All the rules along this path belong to a rule chain.
Note that an accept rule can only belong to one rule chain.
Therefore, if two chains share an accept rule, then they are
considered one chain. In contrast, deny rules can be duplicated
across multiple chains. For example, rule r6,g i v e ni nﬁgure
1(a), would be the last rule in each rule chain. Once all the
rules have been associated with a chain, all possible rule
chains have been found for the policy. For example, the rule
chains for the policy given in ﬁgure 1(a) are c1 = {r1,r 5,r 6},
c2 = {r2,r 6}, c3 = {r3,r 6},a n dc4 = {r4,r 6}.
Once the rule chains have been determined, they can be
distributed to the ﬁrewall nodes in the array. When multiple
chains are given to a node, the rules that belong to the chains
must be merged to form the local policy. Merging requires
rules to adhere to the precedence constraints speciﬁed by the
original policy DAG (as in rule sorting) [6]. For example,
merging c2, c3,a n dc4 requires placing r6 at the end. Once
the chains have been assigned to a local policy, the rules can
be sorted in accordance to precedence constraints to reduce
the number of comparisons.
Distributing chains and merging rules will maintain policy
integrity since the accept sets for the chains are independent
(ﬁrst condition), and every accept rule in the original policy
exists in only one chain (second condition). Furthermore,
merging the rules assures shadowing will not occur in the local
policies (assuming shadowing does not occur in the original
policy). This approach is more formally stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: Distributing and merging the rule chains of a
policy R across function parallel ﬁrewall will maintain policy
integrity.
Proof: Assume d chains are found in the policy R and let
Ak represent the accept set of the kth chain. Each rule chain
represents an independent accept set since all intersecting rules
will always belong to the same chain and accept rules only
belong to one chain, therefore the intersection requirement is
met (
d
k=1 Ak = ∅). For the second requirement,
d
k=1 Ak =
A, consider a packet that is accepted by rule ri in the policy
R, therefore ri is the ﬁrst match. The rule ri would also be
the ﬁrst match in the chain that contains ri regardless which
processor ri resides since all intersecting rules will belong to
the same chain (any subsequent matching rules would appear
after ri) and merging prevents shadowing. In addition, since
every rule must belong to a chain, the second condition is
satisﬁed.
B. Rule Distribution Performance
A rule distribution is sought that minimizes the number of
comparisons required to determine an accept.Given a compre-
hensive policy R a n da na r r a yo fm ﬁrewalls, each ﬁrewall j in
the array will implement a local-policy Rj which consists of
nj rules where r
j
i is the ith rule in the local-policy. In addition,
let p
j
i is the probability of the ith rule in local-policy j being
the ﬁrst match.
To determine the average number of comparisons for a
given packet, assume each ﬁrewall in the array requires one
time-unit to compare the packet to a rule. Then assume the
ﬁrewalls are initially empty and synchronized so that each
starts processing a packet at the same time. When the ﬁrst
packet arrives, it is compared to the ﬁrst rule in each of
the m local policies. Therefore, after the ﬁrst time-unit, the
packet has been compared to m rules. The probability that the
original ﬁrst match (as deﬁn e db yt h eR) is found in the ﬁrst
time-unit is the sum of the probabilities of the ﬁrst rule in each
local policy. Similarly, the probability the ﬁrst-match occurs
in two time-units is equal to the sum of the probabilities of
the second rule in each local policy. The expected number of
rule comparisons required to ﬁnd the original ﬁrst match in a
function parallel ﬁrewall can be computed as
max(n
j) 
i=1
i ·
m 
j=1
p
j
i =
m 
j=1
n
j 
i=1
i · p
j
i,=
m 
j=1
E(Rj) (2)
However, each rule in R is considered only once in the
calculation, since only the average number of comparisons
required for a ﬁrst-match is considered. If a rule is duplicated
(such as r6 in the distribution given in ﬁgure 2(b)), then
it is only considered once in the calculation at its earliest
occurrence within the local policies. As a result of only
considering each rule once, the sum of the probabilities across
the local policies should equal one,
m
j=1
n
j
i=1 p
j
i =1 .
For example, the expected number of comparisons required
to ﬁnd the original ﬁrst match for the system given in Figure
2(b) is
1 · (p1
1 + p2
1)+2· (p1
2 + p2
2)+3· (p1
3 + p2
3)=
1 · (p2 + p1)+2· (p3 + p5)+3· (p4 + p6)=2 .35
Note that rule r6 is duplicated in the distribution to maintain
integrity. It is the third rule in R1 and the fourth rule in R2;
however, the rule is only considered once in the calculation
above.
The overall performance of the ﬁrewall is improved by
balancing the number of rules on each node as well as placing
rule chains so that high probability rules are located near the
beginning of each local policy. Balancing the number of rules
prevents ﬁrewalls in the array from becoming a bottleneck,
speciﬁcally those with longer local policies. For example,
consider two ﬁrewalls conﬁgured in a function parallel fashion.Let L be the set of rule chains determined from a policy
with n rules. Furthermore assume the ﬁrst match probability
for each rule pi in the policy is equal to 1
n. In this case
equation 2 becomes 1
n
2
j=1
n
j
i=1 i = 1
n
2
j=1
n
j(n
j+1)
nj .T h e
optimal number of rules per local policy is given by taking the
derivative of this equation which yields nj = n
2.
Therefore given a set of rule chains our objective is to
ﬁnd a partitioning of the rule chains into m subsets (local
policies) such that max(ni,n j) is minimized for all i,j <= m,
where ni is the total number of rules in local policy Ri.
Unfortunately this objective is equivalent to the k-partitioning
problem, which is known to be NP-complete [11].
Deﬁnition: (k-partitioning). Partition a given set of positive
integer numbers into k subsets such that the sums of the
elements in each subset are equal.
An algorithm which can ﬁnd an optimal distribution of rules
when all probabilities are the same can then ﬁnd a solution to
the k-partitioning problem. Therefore determining the optimal
rule distribution for a function parallel ﬁrewall is NP-hard.
Theorem 3: k-partitioning ∝ Determining the optimal pol-
icy distribution for function parallel ﬁrewall
Proof: Recall that for k-partition the problem is to decide
whether a given multiset of integers S can be partitioned into
k subsets that have the same sum. Given input  S,k  for the
k-partition problem, perform the following polynomial-time
transformation. For each integer l in set S create a distinct
rule chain of length l. We now have a set of rule chains (call
it L) where each individual rule chain represents an integer in
the original multiset S. Now simply solve the function parallel
rule distribution on input  L,k ,w h e r ek = m the number
of ﬁrewalls in the array. The solution to function parallel rule
distribution returns k subsets where max(ni,n j) is minimized
for all i,j ≤ k – call this value maxDifference.T o
determine if there is a solution to the k-partition problem we
must simply determine if the value of maxDifference is
zero. We may perform this check in polynomial time in the
following manner:
Let high =0and low = ∞ // highest and lowest positive sum
for (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
if ni <l o w , then low = ni
if ni >h i g h , then high = ni
end
if(high − low == 0) // all subsets sum to same value
convert each rule chain back to its corresponding integer value
return the k subsets of S that comprise the solution to
k-partition
else
No Solution
end
C. Sorted Horizontal Rule Distribution Algorithm
A fast and efﬁcient distribution algorithm is needed since
determining the optimal rule distribution may be problematic.
The rule distribution algorithm proposed in this paper ﬁrst de-
termines the set of rule chains L for the policy R.O n c eL has
been determined, the algorithm sorts the rule chains according
to the average number of comparisons per rule chain. Note
the chains can appear in any order since they are independent
(non-overlappingaccept sets). For example consider the policy
in ﬁgure 1(a) the ordered set of chains would be {c2,c 3,c 4,c 1}
since {E(c2) <E (c3) <E (c4) <E (c1)}. Using the sorted
list, the chains are distributed and merged across the processors
in a horizontal fashion. For example if the ﬁrewalls in the array
are sequentially numbered starting with 0, then the kth ordered
chain, ck, is assigned to the kmodm processor. The horizontal
distribution attempts to evenly distribute the rules across the
local policies (primary objective). In addition sorting ensures
chains with the smallest average number of comparisons are
distributed ﬁrst (placed near the end of the local policies).
Once the local policies are determined, the rules are sorted
again (while maintaining dependencies) to further reduce the
number of comparisons.
For the function parallel system shown in ﬁgure 2(b) and
the policy given in ﬁgure 1(a), the distribution using this
method would be R1 = {c3,c 1} and R2 = {c2,c 4} which
is equivalent to R1 = {r1,r 5,r 3,r 6} and R2 = {r4,r 2,r 6}.
The average number of comparisons for the ﬁrst match is 2.25,
using this distribution.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The performance of the proposed distribution method for
function parallel ﬁrewalls (section III-C) was measured under
realistic conditions using simulation. A comparison is made
between the sorted horizontal rule distribution algorithm
presented in this paper and a simple distribution method where
rule chains are distributed horizontally to ﬁrewalls in a round
robin fashion. In addition, simulation results will show the
performance of a comparable data parallel ﬁrewall.
For each experiment the parallel designs always consisted
of four ﬁrewalls. Packets lengths were uniformly distributed
between 40 and 1500 bytes, while all legal IP addresses were
equally probable. 1024 ﬁrewall rules were generated such that
accepted packets are 6 times more likely than denied packets,
which has been shown to occur in actual ﬁrewall policies [7].
Figure 3 shows the average packet delay of the parallel ﬁre-
walls and the rule distribution methods. As seen in the graph,
if the arrival rate is low the function parallel designs typically
perform better than the equivalent data parallel conﬁguration.
This is because in the function parallel system all the ﬁrewalls
are used to process packets regardless of arrival rate (none are
idle). When arrival rate is low it is possible to have ﬁrewalls
idle in the data parallel design.
At high arrival rates, the data parallel design has a lower
delay than a function parallel system using a horizontal
distribution. This is expected since data parallel design is
more capable of managing high data rates due to dividing the
arriving stream of packets. If the chains are sorted based on
the average number of comparisons prior to distribution, the
function parallel design performs better than the data parallel
system. The percent improvement ranges from 25% to 86%
better than a simple horizontal distribution. This is because
sorting chains moves rules (or chains of rules) that more more
likely to match a packet closer to the beginning of the local0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
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Fig. 3. Average packet delay as the arrival rate increases for different parallel ﬁrewall designs and rule distributions. Parallel array consisted of four ﬁrewalls.
The proposed horizontal sorted rule distribution for the function parallel design consistently performs the best.
policies. Therefore the distribution algorithm presented in this
paper is a effective method for improving function parallel
performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Functional parallelism is a scalable solution for inspecting
packets in a high-speed environment. However, the system
performance is dependent on how the rules are distributed.
This paper described guidelines for function parallel pol-
icy management. Integrity is maintained if ﬁrewall rules are
distributed based on the security policy accept set,w h i c h
describes the set of packets that will be accepted. Distribution
must be performed such that the union of each local accept
set equals the original accept set (original and distributed
policies accept the same packets), while the intersection of
the local accept sets is the empty set (a packet will be
accepted by only one ﬁrewall). Given a policy, many different
distributions that maintain integrity are possible. The expected
number of comparisons for a ﬁrst-match was developed to
compare possible distributions. A distribution algorithm was
then described that ordered rule chains (intersecting sets of
rules). Experimental results show the proposed sorted hori-
zontal distribution method can provide signiﬁcant performance
improvements (upwards of 86%) as compared to a simple
round robin distribution.
While the function parallel ﬁrewall architecture is very
promising, several open questions exist with regards to policy
distribution. For example, given the need for QoS in future net-
works, it is important to develop methods for distributing rules
such that trafﬁc ﬂows are isolated. In this case a certain type
of trafﬁc would be processed by a certain ﬁrewall. Another
open question is the optimization of local ﬁrewall policies,
including redundant policies. However, optimization can only
occur if the integrity of the policy is maintained. Finally the
ability to dynamically manage changing policies, in terms
of match probabilities and rule additions/deletions, should be
considered. Given these policy dynamics fast algorithms that
provide simple updates, instead of complete redistributions,
are needed.
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